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There is a growing consensus that inflation
is not an entirely "neutral" process. Institu-
tional features of the economy, such as tax and
credit-market policies, can interact with infla-
tion to affect relative prices, leading to dis-
turbances in the levels of real activity in var-
ious sectors of the economy.! Nowhere is this
phenomenon more evident than in the housing
market. Significant changes in the relative
price ofhousing have accompanied the general
inflation of the last decade and a half. These
events have also prompted changes in the level
of housing consumption and patterns of hous-
ing tenure.
This article presents a simple model of the
housing market and examines the behavior of
the market during a period of rising inflation
expectations. The demand for housing is
viewed as the demand for an asset stock in a
household or landlord's portfolio. This ap-
proach distinguishes between the "price" and
user "cost" of housing, and emphasizes the
role of expectations in determining housing
demand. We describe how inflation expecta-
tions and other economic variables can pro-
duce observed changes in housing prices,
rents, and tenure patterns.
The results of the analysis have a number of
implications for housing policy and for the reg-
ulation ofhome-mortgage credit. In particular,
we find little evidence that, in the aggregate,
a "crisis" exists in the price or supply of hous-
ing, or that "affordability" has been a serious
constraint. Moreover, we argue that the often-
lamented decline in the rental market-with
the related rise in conversions of apartments
to condominiums--ean be seen simply as a
symptom of the market's adjustment to infla-
tion pressures. Finally, the discussion puts into
focus the current debate about the appropriate
methodology for incorporating housing costs
in the most commonly used index of prices,
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The first section of this paper describes the
trends in the housing market that have devel-
oped during the recent inflation. The second
section presents a highly simplified view of the
housing market, and explores the processes
that determine housing prices, rents, and the
balance between rental and owner-occupant
modes of housing tenure. A third section pro-
vides some elaborations of the simple model,
including its consistency with rational expec-
tations and the effects of imperfections in the
credit market. The fourth section presents em-
pirical support for the thesis developed in this
paper, and the final section discusses the policy
implications of the paper's conclusions.
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I. Recent Tre~ds in Housing
The housing market has changed dramati- Between 1970 and 1980, the price of a single-
cally during the last decade, as seen most no- family home
2 of a given quality increased at
tably in the rapid increase in housing prices about a 9.3-percent annual rate, compared
relative to most other prices in the economy. with a 6.8-percent annual rise in overall con-
sumer prices (measured by the personal-con-
sumption expenditures deflator). This increase
in real housing prices (Chart 1), coupled with
29nsmg mortgage rates, has prompted officials
to argue that housing had become "unafford-
able." Yet, the consumption of housing ser-
vices, by any measure, has apparently contin-
ued to rise. The simple number of housing
units has grown faster than the population
(Chart 2), while the quality ofhousing services
has risen as well. The average new home in
1979 had a greater floor area, more bathrooms
and bedrooms, and more amenities (such as
garage space and central air conditioning) than
a new home in 1970.
3
Another major recent phenomenon has
been the decline of the rental housing market.
The earlier steep decline in the rental share of
the housing market had slowed in the 1960s,
but then accelerated again in the last decade.
In 1970, 37 percent of all American families
depended upon rental housing for their hous-
ing needs, but by 1980 the figure may have
dropped to as low as 33 percent. Such a decline
in the rental share would be four times greater
than the percentage decline registered in the
previous decade.
4
As one of the manifestations of this trend,
many young households, traditionally renters,
have become owner-occupants. In 1970, only
about 39 percent ofhousehold heads under the
age of 30 were owner-occupants; by 1975 that
proportion had increased to over 46 percent.5
Although homeownership has broadened to
include some relatively low-income young fam-
ilies, the very poorest families remain in rental
housing. Renters on average earned 64 percent
of the national median income in 1970, but
only 55 percent in 1977.
Chart 1



















30In contrast to the trends in housing prices,
housing rents have generally fallen relative to
general consumer prices. Between 1970 and
1980, real rents declined approximately 10 per-
cent (Chart 3). Combined, the trends in prices
and rents have reduced the attractiveness of
rental-property investment for many investors,
despite the prospect of capital gains. The
often-heard lament is that investment in rental
housing does not "pencil OUt."6
In terms ofthe housing stock itself, the shift
away from rental housing has taken two forms.
First, the rate of construction of rental prop-
erty has dropped significantly despite large
Federal subsidies. In 1979, a generally average
year for housing, total rental-unit construction
(subsidized and unsubsidized) declined almost
20 percent from a year earlier, The 210,000
unsubsidized units started in 1979 was the low-
est number in 20 years, and less than half the
historic peak, and the number started in 1980
may have dropped as low as 120,000 units.
7
Second, many existing multi-unit properties
have been converted to condominiums. In
1979, 195,000 rental units were converted-up
70 percent in a single year. A more subtle form
ofconversion, however, has also occurred with
a decline in the proportion of rented single-
family homes. In 1970, 19.3 percent of single-
family homes were occupied by renters; by
1976, this figure had fallen to 16.6 percent.
8
Some policymakers see these trends as cre-
ating a dual "crisis" in housing. On the one
hand, they fear that rising housing prices and
mortgage rates are rapidly making owner-oc-
cupied housing "unaffordable."9 On the other
hand, they fear that the shrinking rate of new
rental housing construction and the conversion
of existing rental properties to condominiums
are choking off the rental alternative. Policy-
makers have developed many responses to this
perceived crisis, including expansion of gov-
ernmental responsibility in the housing area.
Indeed, in 1979, an estimated 75 percent of
multifamily starts were Federally subsidized or
insured, and governmental mortgage-assis-
tance programs have proliferated, particularly
at the local level. It is important, therefore, to
understand clearly the genesis of the trends
which have stimulated this policy response.
Chart 2
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II. Modelling the Housing Market
In this section we employ a demand-and-
supply model of the housing market to dem-
onstrate how the economic environment of re-
cent years has produced the changes noted
above in housing prices, rents, and tenure pat-
terns. The model first analyzes owner-occu-
pied housing and then expands to incorporate
the rental market as well. The discussion fo-
cuses on the market for the housing stock, but
it also has implications for the market for hous-
ing services, because housing services flow in
rough proportion to the stock.
To simplify matters, we assume that the
housing stock can be meaningfully measured
in quality-adjusted units. Thus an increase in
the stock can be interpreted as either an in-
crease in the number of structures, an increase
in their quality (that is, their ability to produce
housing services), or both.
Housing demand
The first step in devising our model is the
specification of the demand for the housing
stock. Many housing studies have treated the
demand for the housing stock analogously to
the demand for consumption goods, where the
purchase price and the consumer's income are
the relevant arguments ofdemand. 10 However,
the housing stock is not a consumption good
perse, but rather an asset that can be employed
by owner-occupants to produce for themselves
a flow of consumption services (shelter, pri-
vacy, access to community services, etc.) many
periods into the future.
Viewed from this perspective, a consumer's
decision on housing-stock ownership thus has
features of both a consumption decision and
an investment/production decision. This has
several implications for the proper specifica-
tion of the demand relationship. First, since a
household uses housing over a period of time,
the "price" variable relevant to today's housing
demand is the expected costofthis use, relative
to other prices, for each period over the plan-
ning horizon-not simply the purchase price of
the asset itself. Obvious cost flows associated
with homeownership include the foregone in-
terest earnings on the equity in the house, the
interest cost of borrowed funds, depreciation,
maintenance, insurance, property taxes and
real-estate transaction costs. In addition, how-
ever, the "investment" aspects of homeown-
32ership offer the prospect of capital gains or
losses over the holding period; thus user costs
are reduced by any expected increase in the
value of the house.
Second, a household's consumption of goods
and services-including housing services-ap-
parently changes proportionally with the
household's wealth or permanent income.
Since housing services flow in proportion to
the stock, stock demand thus should depend
upon the household's real wealth-primarily,
of course, the present value of expected future
real income-as perceived by the household at
the time it does its planning.
We can thus write the demand for housing
assets more precisely as
where Un is the nominal user cost of housing
capital (assumed for simplicity to be the same
for each period in the planning horizon), Pc is
the price of consumption goods each period,
and W is a measure of real wealth.
11 The de-
sired stock, D~, is positively related to the scale
variable, W, and negatively related to relative
"prices," UnlPc, as in traditional consumer the-
ory.
On the assumption that there are no income
taxes and that depreciation, maintenance and
property taxes can be ignored, the nominal
user cost can be approximated by
where i is the nominal interest rate on long-
term investmel).ts, Po is the nominal price of
housing, and Pc is the expected nominal in-
crease in home values. The first term in this
equation is the interest cost ofhousing (that is,
the sum of foregone interest on equity and
borrowing cost) and the second term is the
expected capital gain.
Income-tax law potentially affects this sim-
ple measure of an owner-occupant's user cap-
ital cost in a number of ways. First, interest
income is taxable and interest payments are
deductible from taxable income. Thus the in-
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terest rate should be expressed in after-tax
terms. Second, U.S. tax laws potentially affect
the capital-gains term in the user-cost formula.
However, the exemptions from capital gains
taxes are so liberal that, for practical purposes,
the homeowner can anticipate receiving the
gross capital gain.
Another important implication is the influ-
ence of inflation expectations on the nominal
interest rate. In particular, if lenders expect
prices to rise over an extended period into the
future, they will require higher long-term in-
terest charges in order to compensate for the
expected loss in purchasing power. Empirical
studies indicate thatthe relationship is a simple
one: the nominal interest rate is the sum of the
real interest rate and the expected rate of in-
flation.
Taking these tax features into account, and
incorporating the assumption that the nominal
interest rate is the sum of the real interest rate,
r, and the expected rate of general price infla-




where h is the expected rate of inflation in
housing prices and t is the household's mar-
ginal tax rate. Finally, dividing by Pc, the price
of consumption goods, we obtain
U = P«r+z)(l-t)-h)
where U = UnlPcis the real user cost relevant
to the housing-demand relationship and
P = PnlPcis the real price of housing.
The conceptualization ofhousing demand as
the demand for a durable good offers a number
of insights which are often overlooked in anal-
yses of the housing market. First, the factor
which acts like a "price" variable in the de-
mand relationship is not simply the current
price of housing, but the expected cost to the
owner of the housing asset per period. Unlike
the typical consumption-good price, therefore,
the analogous housing variable is inherently
more difficult to observe because of its pro-
spective nature.Housing supply and market equilibrium
The equilibrium real price of housing assets
is the price that equates the desired stock de-
mand with the actual stock supply. In the short
run, the latter is fixed, but in the long run,
additions to the stock can be made as long as
the real price that clears the market in the
Second, inflation expectations and taxes play
an important role in determining user costs
and, hence, housing demand. For example, if
households expect housing prices to increase
at the same rate as other prices in general (that
is, z = h), then an increase in those expecta-
tions should cause real user costs to fall and,
hence, housing demand to rise. The potency of
the effect, however, is dependent upon the tax
rate. If the tax rate is zero, real user costs will
be insensitive to inflation expectations. (Of
course, if housing inflation expectations differ
from general inflation expectations, user costs
would be sensitive to expectations regardless
of the tax rate-as will be discussed later in
the paper.)
The demand relationship can be illustrated
graphically. The demand curve, D, for the
stock of housing is downward sloping with re-
spect to the real price(Figure 1), because lower
housing prices imply lower user costs, every-
thing else being equal. Changes in inflation
expectations, the tax rate, the real interest rate
or wealth will cause shifts in this curve. An
increase in inflation expectations, for example,










short run is above the price implied by long-
run supply conditions. The long-run supply
curve may not be perfectly elastic with respect
to price, however, because one of the factors
used in housing production-land-is in fixed
supply.
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the re-
sponse of housing prices and the housing stock
to increased inflation expectations. The curve
Sl represents perfectly inelastic supply, and the
curve S2 represents more elastic supply con-
ditions, as might prevail in the long run. The
market is initially in long-run equilibrium at
Po. An increase in inflation expectations would
cause the demand curve to shift from D to D1.
In the short run, the real price would rise to
Pi> inducing additional supply, until the long-
run equilibrium price, P2, is reached.
This simple model shows that first, the mar-
ket is always in equilibrium, in the sense that
housing-asset prices adjust to equate the de-
sired and actual supply. Unless the long-run
supply of housing is perfectly elastic, an in-
crease in inflation expectations will thus cause
a long-run increase in real housing prices. Sec-
ond, this increase in real housing prices is a
one-shot affair. For real housing prices to rise
continuously relative to general prices, infla-
tion expectations must continually be revised
upward.
Third, the model helps distinguish between
movements in the price of housing and move-
ments in the user cost of housing. The rise in
the real price of housing that accompanies an
increase in inflation expectations does not nec-
essarily imply that the real user cost has risen.
On the contrary, in the case of fixed supply
and unchanged wealth, an increase in inflation
expectations leaves the real user cost un-
changed. Otherwise the desired stock (which
depends upon the user cost) would differ from
the fixed supply. The real price has simply risen
to offset the initial reduction in U caused by
the increase in inflation expectations, and
makes households willing once again to hold
the available stock of housing.
Similarly, the real user cost of housing must
fall in response to an increase in inflation ex-pectations when supply is elastic. Otherwise,
households would be unwilling to hold the in-
creased stock supply that is stimulated by the
rise in the real price of housing.
Other variables can also affect the relative
movement of housing prices and costs. Con-
sider, for example, the effect of a change in
wealth. Unless supply is perfectly elastic, an
increase in demand caused by an increase in
wealth will cause real prices to rise. Since there
is no change in inflation expectations to offset
this effect, the user cost must also rise. This is
necessary to clear the market for the available
stock at the higher level of real wealth.
Finally, consider the effect of an increase in
the interest rate (nominal or real). This causes
the demand for the housing stock to decrease,
everything else being equal. Ifthe housing sup-
ply is imperfectly elastic, this will, in turn,
cause real housing prices to fall and the hous-
ing stock to decline. (In Figure 1, demand
shifts back from Dl to D and the price falls
from Pz to Po.) With unchanged wealth, how-
ever, the decline in the housing stock can be
made consistent with demand only if real user
costs are higher in equilibrium.
These examples make it clear that housing
prices do not always move in the same direc-
tion as the perceived cost of housing to the
consumer. Indeed, in the examples above, only
changes in wealth affected user costs and
prices in the same way. Since it is housing costs
that are relevant to housing demand-and the
consumer's welfare-the use of housing prices
in the consumer-price index is thus theoreti-
cally unsatisfactory and may lead to biased
measures of inflation. Indeed, under circum-
stances of rising inflation expectations, the use
of housing price data creates the impression
that costs are rising when precisely the oppo-
site may be true. We will return to this issue
later in this paper.
III. The Rental Market
The model of the housing market described
above involved owner-occupants only. This ap-
proach permitted a simplified presentation
while still offering useful insights into the
workings of the housing market. Moreover,
since owner-occupancy is the dominant mode
of housing tenure in the United States, such a
simplification is useful in the aggregate. How-
ever, this begs an interesting question: why is
homeownership so dominant?
Frequently it is said that Americans prefer
certain features of owner-occupied housing,
which differs qualitatively from rental housing.
This view suggests that rents and owner-occu-
pant user costs can move with considerable
independence; indeed the relative level of
these variables would determine the tenure
balance. This "segmented markets" approach
has been followed in several recent studies of
the home-ownership decision.
12 Such an ap-
proach, however, seems somewhat ad hoc. It
is difficult to conceive of important housing
services that can not be obtained in the rental
market; essentially all types of housing are
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available on a rental basis. There are other
distinctions, of course, that arise as a result of
the nature of the transactions involved-home-
ownership may impede mobility, for example-
but such transaction costs tend to affect the
level of owner-occupant housing costs, and not
necessarily their relationship to the market
rent for similar housing.
We take an alternative approach, assuming
that there is no important distinction between
the services of rental and owner-occupied
housing, and argue that other factors deter-
mine the equilibrium tenure share. In partic-
ular, we extend the model to incorporate the
different tax treatment oflandlords and owner-
occupants. We illustrate how taxes alone can
make the tenure balance determinate even
when market rents, and owner-occupant user
costs, are equal on the margin.
Tax policy and the rental market
Both landlords and owner-occupants per-
ceive a user cost of capital associated with
ownership of housing. Indeed, if a rented unitwere indistinguishable from an owner-occu-
pied unit-and if there were no difference in
tax treatment-the user cost perceived by the
landlord would be the same as that perceived
by an owner-occupant. A landlord would be
unable to charge a rent in excess of this user
cost because households, by assumption, can
obtain equivalent services through ownership.
In such a case, the tenure balance would be
indeterminate without additional assumptions
about quality differences, tastes, transactions
costs, or other factors.
In fact, of course, the tax system alters this
simple description in several ways. First, tax
law treats property owned by landlords and
property owned by occupants quite differently.
Unlike owner-occupants, landlords are taxed
on the income that flows from their housing
stock because that income is "realized" in the
form of rental income. Landlords are also
more likely to pay taxes on the nominal capital
gains they enjoy. Both factors tend to make
the breakeven rent that a landlord must charge
greater than the user cost perceived by an
owner-occupant facing a similar tax rate and
level of inflation expectations. For example,
assume that the landlord also faces the rate, c,
on capital gains. Then the breakeven situation
for the landlord is to charge a rent, R, per
period, which, after tax, is equal to after-tax




R = (1-t) P«r+z)(1-t)-(1-c)z).
This market rent is clearly greater than the
implicit rent or user cost
U = P«r+z)(1-t) z)
perceived by a similarly situated owner-occu-
pant. Moreover, it can be shown that rents and
owner-occupant user costs respond differently
to changes in inflation expectations. In general,
for capital-gains tax rates of a reasonable size,
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an increase in inflation expectations reduces R
by less than it reduces U, everything else being
equal. 13 This differential sensitivity to inflation
expectations, as we shall see, may contribute
importantly to changes in tenure patterns.
A second important aspect of income-tax
policy is the differential impact of different tax
rates. Because of the treatment of nominal in-
terest, individuals in higher income-tax brack-
ets perceive lower user costs of housing capital
than do individuals in lower income-tax brack-
ets. This applies to both landlords and owner-
occupants. Market rents have to be quite high
to encourage individuals in low income-tax
brackets to own housing, either as landlords or
occupants. This makes both the number of
rental housing units and the number of owner-
occupied units increasing functions ofthe mar-
ket rent.
Rental-market equilibrium
These implications of the tax treatment of
housing suggest a way to determine the equi-
librium rent and tenure balance. First, given
the assumption of qualitative equivalence of
rented and owned housing, the market rent
must equal the user cost of owner-occupancy
on the margin. Otherwise some tenants would
be motivated to become owner-occupants, or
vice versa. Second, the total demand for hous-
ing at that rent (or user cost) must be exactly
equal to the supply. Otherwise the price of
housing would change (thereby affecting rents
and user costs) to equilibrate demand and sup-
ply. Finally, given the assumption that there
are no market imperfections to cause vacant
or unused housing, the entire stock must be
"supplied" by either landlords or owner-occu-
pants.
The consequences of these conditions, given
a fixed supply of housing, can be illustrated
graphically (Figure 2). The curve labelled R
represents the relationship between the market
rent and the ownership or "supply" of rental
units. The curve labelled U graphs the same
relationship for owner-occupied housing. Both
are increasing functions of the market rent (for
the reasons given earlier), but are drawn back-
to-back to incorporate the assumption of afixed total stock of housing. Both curves are
drawn for a given price of housing and a given
level of inflation expectations.
At the intersection of the supply curves V
and R, two of the necessary equilibrium con-
ditions are satisfied: the owner-occupant user
cost equals the market rent, R*, and the total
stock ofhousing is allocated between landlords
and owner-occupants. As drawn (with a higher
landlord-cost relationship) the tenure balance
is skewed toward owner-occupancy. IfR* also
happens to be that rent which makes desired
total demand equal to the fixed supply, then
the figure fully describes the market equilib-
rium.
The diagram can be used to study the effect
of changes in inflation expectations on rentals
and tenure choice, since any factor which af-
fects the user costs of landlords or owner-oc-
cupants can be graphed as shifts in the curves
R and V, respectively. For example, if in-
creased inflation expectations significantly re-
duce the user costs of owner-occupants (but
not of landlords), then the curve V will shift
downward to VI. The intersection of VI with
R describes a lower market rent (and owner-
occupant user cost) as well as a further skewing
of the tenure choice toward owner-occupancy.
This is not the final equilibrium, however,












will cause aggregate housing demand to exceed
the fixed supply. Of course the variable which
will move to ration the housing supply is the
price of housing. Since supply is fixed, only
one rental, R*, clears the market, and housing
prices must rise enough to return user costs to
this previous level. The increase in prices af-
fects both landlords and owner-occupants, so
the R curve shifts to RI and the V curve shifts
to V2 until the opportunity costs are the same
as they were before the change in expectations.
Although opportunity costs are unchanged,
owner-occupancy has been increased, or to put
it somewhat differently, some rental housing
has been converted to owner-occupied hous-
ing. 14 If aggregate supply were somewhat elas-
tic (rather than fixed), real housing prices again
would rise and the tenure balance would
change in the direction of owner-occupancy,
but real user costs and real rents would remain
depressed relative to their initial levels. 15
Relevance of model
The model presented above suggests that
rising inflation expectations have significantly
affected recent changes in housing prices,
rents, and tenure patterns. Widely observed
increases in real housing prices and in the equi-
librium quantity of housing can be explained
in this fashion. Of course, increases in demand
caused by growing numbers of households or
expanded wealth might also be responsible for
these trends, given a somewhat inelastic sup-
ply. However, as the model suggests, such fac-
tors would cause real user costs (and, hence,
real rents) to rise as well, and no such phe-
nomenon has been observed. On the contrary,
real rents have fallen quite consistently for
over a decade. In toto, the relative behavior of
housing prices and rents can best be explained
by rising inflation expectations. 16
Recent increases in owner-occupancy may
also have been stimulated in part by the con-
sequences of increased inflation expectations.
Analysis of tax law suggests that such expec-
tations may be more beneficial to owner-oc-
cupants than to landlords. As a consequence,
rising inflation expectations will cause the ten-ure balance to shift toward increased owner-
occupancy to restore the equivalence, on the
margin, ofthe user costs faced by the two types
of owners. It should be noted that this tenure
shift occurs without movement in the relative
equilibrium values of rents and user costs. In-
deed, market rents are a useful measure of
user costs.
By implication, the decline in the share of
the housing market owned by landlords is ac-
companied by a change in the type oftaxpayers
who find housing ownership attractive on the
margin. At reduced real rents, only very high-
tax rate individuals remain as landlords,
whereas owner-occupancy can be broadened
only if relatively low-tax rate households are
embraced. Both tendencies are consistent with
our analysis concerning the proliferation of
homeownership and the poor environment for
investment in rental housing.
The analysis also helps explain the condo-
minium-conversion phenomenon. In effect,
the model suggests that rental property is con-
verted because rising inflation expectations
make the cost of holding a unit of housing in
a household's portfolio lower for that house-
hold than for a landlord.
17 Tax policy makes
the housing more valuable to potential owner-
occupants than to the landlord, and conversion
brings about the necessary redistribution. In
reality, of course, actual conversion decisions
depend upon changes in taste, landlords' fears
of rent controls, and other factors. However,
the model offers an economic rationale for this
phenomenon that does not depend upon such
ambiguous variables.
IV. Other Considerations
A highly simplified asset-stock demand
model thus appears to be useful in analyzing
present-day housing trends, at least in a cas-
ually empirical manner. A number of other
considerations deserve discussion, however,
because of their policy or empirical implica-
tions.
Credit-market imperfections
One such consideration concerns the effect
of certain lending conventions on the behavior
of the housing market. Lenders regularly em-
ploy loan-qualification standards which limit
loan-income ratios, such as the ratio of
monthly loan payments and the borrower's
current monthly income. Critics argue that this
practice, combined with the convention of a
fixed payment mortgage, causes "affordability"
problems as rising inflation expectations (and,
hence, rising nominal interest rates) cause
monthly loan payments to rise relative to in-
come. (An unstated corollary of this view is
that the rise in housing demand and prices can
then only be explained by increases in wealth
or by population-based demand pressures.)18
There is good reason to believe, however,
that the "affordability" problem thus may have
been only a minor element in recent housing-
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market trends. First, the qualification con-
straint may not be effectively binding in the
long run because of changes in lender behav-
ior. An increase in inflation expectations does
not affect the ultimate "security" of a loan.
Neither the present value of a fixed-payment
loan, nor the present value of a borrower's
income, differ at different levels of inflation
expectations. Thus profit-oriented lenders
have an incentive, as inflation expectations
rise, to relieve the borrower of the constraint
imposed by the qualification standard. This re-
lief may take the form of a broadened income
definition (which recognizes the spouse's in-
come, for example), more liberal interpreta-
tion of qualification standards, or pressure on
regulators to develop mortgage instruments
(such as the graduated payment mortgage)
which help borrowers overcome the cash-flow
burden imposed early in the life of the typical
fixed-payment mortgage.
Second, individuals have some ability to
rearrange their asset portfolios so as to miti-
gate an undesired constraint on the amount of
mortgage liabilities they hold in their portfo-
lios. In particular, individuals may dissave to
make larger contributions to home equity, and
thereby reduce their mortgage requirements.Finally, and most importantly, the notion of
an increasingly binding "affordability" con-
straint is inconsistent with observed housing-
market trends. A borrowing constraint, in ef-
fect, tends to raise the user cost of housing
capital and, therefore, tends to raise real rents
in equilibrium. 19 But if this constraint had
tightened in recent years, real rents should
have risen rather than fallen as they apparently
have done. Of course, the possibility remains
that loan-qualification practices and "cash
flow" constraints have had some effect, but
have been overwhelmed by other factors.
Speculation and the housing market
Our model suggests that inflation processes
can produce changes in real housing prices dur-
ing the transition period while the housing
market adjusts to a new level of inflation ex-
pectations. With unchanged expectations about
the general rate ofinflation-andwith housing-
price expectations linked to these general ex-
pectations~prices would rise only at the rate
of prices in general. Why, then, have we seen
a relatively sustained rise in real housing prices
over the last decade or so? One possibility that
is consistent with the model is a frequent up-
ward revision in overall inflation expecta-
tions-understandably so, since households
were buffeted by an acceleration of actual in-
flation during this period.
Another possibility-one that is compatible
with the popular notion of a "speculative bub-
ble"-is the potentially self-reinforcing nature
of the movements in housing demand and
housing prices. This view, argues, in effect,
that households have formed their housing in-
flation expectations separately from "general"
inflation expectations (as incorporated in nom-
inal interest rates), and that they have relied
heavily on past housing-price movements to
form these expectations. With such an adap-
tive model, it is easy to construct a scenario
with an explosive rise in real housing prices, in
the following manner. A real increase in hous-
ing price (however initiated) would cause in-
dividuals to expect additional increases. (In the
language of our model, h increases more than
z.) This, in turn, causes housing demand to
rise and stimulates further increases in real
housing prices. With further increases in ex-
pectations, the process ofrising real prices con-
tinues until some other factor intervenes and
dampens or reverses expectations. With the
process reversing, the "bubble" can then burst
in a crescendo of falling real housing prices.
Such a scenario seems to be implicitin many
popular discussions of real-estate booms and
crashes.20 The relevance of "price bubbles" in
asset markets has been questioned, however-
on an empirical if not a theoretical level-by
economists working within the framework of
"rational expectations" theory.21 Thus, we are
led to conclude that the explanation for recent
housing-market developments should be sought
in changes in general inflation expectations,
rather than separately formed housing expec-
tations.
V. Empirical Analysis
Our analysis appears to offer a description
of housing-market behavior that is consistent,
in a very general way, with observed market
trends. However, there are a number of ad-
vantages to exploring the implied relationships
in a more rigorous way. First, since many other
factors may influence the housing market, it
would be useful to observe the significance of
the statistical relationship between housing-
market trends and inflation expectations. Sec-
ond, empirical analysis might shed some light
upon several unresolved theoretical issues. For
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example, does a representation of general in-
flation expectations satisfactorily explain hous-
ing prices and rent relationships, or is it nec-
essary to add housing inflation expectations as
well? Also, is "affordability" a factor in the
behavior of the housing market?
Rental-price relationship
To explore these issues, we employ two re-
lationships derived from the earlier discussion.
The first is the equilibrium condition that real
rents should equal owner-occupant housingcosts, or
R = P((l-t)(r+z)-h+f)
which may be rewritten
RlP+h = (l-t) i+f
where f represents the effects of depreciation,
maintenance, insurance and property taxes-
assumed to be a constant proportion of the
value of the stock. If overcoming a cash-flow
constraint imposes costs on a household in pro-
portion to the nominal interest rate, then
R/P+h = (l-t+a)i+f
where "a" is the cash-flow proportion. With
the aid of regression analysis and information
on i, h, and R/P, we can obtain estimates of f
and the coefficient on i. We can then compare
these estimates with a priori notions to obtain
a crude indication of the consistence of the
model with the data.
We estimated this linear relationship using
quarterly data and two different classes of as-
sumptions concerning the formation of hous-
ing-price inflation expectations. In the first
modei, we assumed that households expect
housing prices to rise at the same rate as prices
of goods overall. In the second model, we em-
ployed a separate variable, assuming that hous-
ing inflation expectations are formed adap-
tively. (See Appendix A for details on the
construction of these measures.) Each model
was estimated using both ordinary least
squares (OLS) and a Cochrane-Orcutt tech-
nique for treating serially correlated errors.
Outside estimates of the marginal tax rate,
t, suggest values in the .20 to .30 range and a
figure of 5 to 7 percent for the fraction of real
housing value represented by maintenance, de-
preciation, property taxes and other value-
based components ofuser costs (Table 1).22 On
this basis, the first model performs quite well.
The marginal tax rate (.27) and the mainte-
nance factor (8.8) are quite precisely estimated
and near the anticipated values, if we assume
that the affordability constraint (measured by
"a") is not significant.
The second model performs less well, in a
statistical sense, and is sensitive to the esti-
mation technique. In the Cochrane-Orcutt ver-
sion, for example, the constraint term is indis-
tinguishable from zero. More importantly,
however, a large affordability constraint (that
is, a large "a" coefficient) is necessary to yield
reasonable tax-rate estimates. Thus, in this
model at least, the finding of an affordability
constraint is linked with the assumption of sep-
arately formed housing inflation expectations.23
Since there is little empirical evidence to sup-
Table 1
Regressions on the Rental/Price Relationship, 1965.1 to 1978.1V
Regression Coefficients Implicit Point Estimates
Nominal Depreciation,
Housing Price Inflation Estimation Interest Maintenance,
Model Expectations Assumption Technique Constant Rate R2 D.W. Tax Rate et. al. (0/0)
1a. Same as consumption prices OLS 8.92 .722 .69 1.21 .28( + a) 8.9
in general (15.42) (9.55)
lb. Same as consumption prices Cochrane- 8.83 .734 .70 1.94 .27( + a) 8.8
in general Orcutt (9.31) (5.93)
2a. Housing expectations formed OLS 8.62 1.10 .41 1.06 .1O( +a) 8.6
separately (3.60) (3.53)
2b. Housing expectations formed Cochrane- 5.07 1.44 .54 1.90 - .44(+a) 5.0
separately Orcutt (0.92) (2.14)
NOTE: t-ratios are in parentheses. The dependent variable is RIP + h. The independent variable is a distributed lag on
the nominal interest rate, i. See Appendix A for additional computational details.
40port the existence of "speculatively" formed
expectations in asset markets, we are inclined
to reject the finding of an affordability con-
straint as well. In light of the combined evi-
dence, therefore, there appears to be little sup-
port for the notion that housing inflation
expectations are formed separately (at least as
modelled), or that "affordability" is an impor-
tant factor in the housing market.
Levels ofprices and rents
The model also identified the factors that
should affect the levels of real housing prices
and real rents. In particular, under conditions
of imperfectly elastic supply, real housing
prices should be positively related to housing
inflation expectations and household wealth,
and negatively related to the interest rate,
everything else being equal. We have argued
that real rents, on the other hand, should be-
have in the same way as user costs. Thus, fol-
lowing our earlier arguments, rents should be
negatively related to housing inflation expec-
tations and positively related to wealth and the
interest rate, everything else being equal.
These implications can be tested by regress-
ing data on real housing prices and real rents,
respectively, on measures of inflation expec-
tations, the interest rate, and household
wealth. However, a lagged measure of the
housing stock, because of its probable sluggish
adjustment, must also be included in the
regression. Everything else being equal, a
larger existing supply implies lower housing
prices and rents.
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All of the signs of the estimated coefficients
are consistent with the thesis we have pre-
sented under the assumed circumstances of im-
perfectly elastic supply (Table 2).25 Increases
in wealth per household (proxied by real dis-
posable permanent income) cause both prices
and rents to rise. Increases in the nominal in-
terest rate decrease real housing prices but, as
expected, cause real rents to rise as the resul-
tant low prices cause reductions in the housing
stock. The effect of capital-gains expectation
is captured by the sign of the coefficient on
inflation expectations. It indicates that in-
creases in housing inflation expectations in-
crease real housing prices, but reduce real
rents as suppliers respond to high prices by
adding more housing to the stock.
Finally, the significance of the coefficient on
the lagged housing stock suggests that stock
adjustment is, indeed, a sluggish process; the
existing stock is an important determinant of
current prices and rent levels. The coefficient
has a negative sign, as expected, because in-
creases in the existing stock reduce both real
prices and rents, everything else being equal.
Since the coefficient on the housing-stock vari-
able in the long-linear regression can be inter-
preted as an elasticity, the real housing price
apparently is quite responsive to changes in
the existing stock. A one-percentchange in the
lagged stock supply results in over a two-per-
cent change in the price. In a world in which
the housing supply is imperfectly elastic and
adjustment processes are sluggish, this is con-
sistent with inelastic housing-stock demand.
Table 2
Price and Rent Regressions, 1965.1 to 1978.1V
(all variableS in log form)
Nominal
Interest Inflation Permanent Lagged Real Housing
Constant Rate Expectations income/Household Stock/Household R2 D.W.
1. PRICE -7.9 -.30 .58 1.7 -2.8 .98 2.3
(2.6) (6.5) (7.8) (4.0) (4.7)
2. RENT 1.0 .063 -.13 .55 -1.6 .99 1.6
(1.0) (1.6) (5.26) (4.0) (8.0)
NOTE: t-ratios presented in parentheses. See Appendix A for additional computational details.
41Inflation and the CPI
More indirectly, inflation's impact on hous-
ing aggravates a problem created by the incor-
rect treatment of housing in the consum~r­
price index. The appropriate measure of hous-
ing costs-that is, the measure that is relevant
to demand and welfare analysis-is the oppor-
tunity cost or user cost of housing. Although
this measure depends importantly on price ex-
pectations and is inherently impossible to ob-
serve directly, theory suggests that it should
move with market rentals.
In contrast, CPI procedures developed in the
1950's to reflect homeownership costs confuse
costs ofpurchasing the asset with various costs
involved in holding the asset per period.
27 The
consumer-price index currently employs
weighted data on the price of new homes (part
ofthe CPI's "home purchase" component) and
mortgage interest costs (the component "con-
tract mortgage interest costs"), in addition to
property taxes, insurance, and maintenance
and repair. The home-purchase and mortgage-
interest components, with a weight of about
17 percent in the overall CPI, increase sharply
in magnitude as inflation expectations rise. But
Housing crisis
Inflation has been at the root ofmany ofthe
industry's recent changes-but this does not
mean that inflation has caused a crisis in the
form of unaffordaBle housing or unavailability
of rental housing. In general, properly meas-
ured housing costs have fallen relative to other
prices despite the rise in housing prices. The
trend away from rental housing, including the
conversion of rental housing to owner-occu-
pancy status, represents a natural consequence
of households' attempts to cope with the com-
bined impact of inflation and tax regulation.
Some communities have tried to address the
"loss" of rental housing to condominiums by
blocking conversions, but that "solution" ac-
tually reduces households' aggregate welfare,
because it blocks their attempts to find the
lowest-cost housing alternative.
Disparate tax treatment of the two types of
property appears to be the basic cause of the
shift away from rental housing in an inflation-
ary era. The trend could be reversed, perhaps,
if owner-occupants' implicit rental income
were included in their taxable income, and if
landlords' depreciation allowances reflected
market rather than historic value. Public-fi-
nance economists have frequently proposed
such changes on grounds of tax equity, but the
political realities argue against their accept-
ance, especially in view of the longstanding
policy commitment to encourage homeowner-
ship.
VI. Policy Implications
Rising inflation expectations apparently Nonetheless, the distortion by inflation on
have been closely involved in the recently ob- housing patterns is arbitrary and thus unlikely
served pattern of rising housing prices, falling to be socially optimal. In addition, the distor-
real rents, and-by implication-a shrinking tion is not confined to choices within the hous-
rental-housing sector. However, we have found ing market. The combination of inflation and
no evidence to suggest any similar separate special tax treatment tends to alter relative
influence of housing-price inflation expecta- rates of return within housing, and also be-
tions, as in models of speculative price bub- tween housing and other assets in the economy.
bles. Similarly, trends in real rents suggest that (In terms oftax treatment, incidentally, a land-
"affordability" has had little if any impact on lord's housing investment is analogous to in-
recent housing trends. A number of policy im- vestment in general.) Thus, capital that oth-
plications flow from these results and from our erwise would have flowed into industrial uses
earlier discussion. frequently has been attracted to housing in-
stead. Trends in the composition of household
portfolios verify a dramatic shift by households
out of financial assets (including corporate
equities) into housing assets.
26 Thus the true
"crisis" may be that too much-rather than too
little-housing is produced and consumed in
our economy.
42as we have seen, this is exactly when real hous-
ing costs tend to fall. The current CPI proce-
dures thus lead to severe overstatement of the
contribution of housing to inflation.
A conservative estimate of the overstate-
ment can be derived from experimental "rental
equivalence" measures developed by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics.
28 The CPI apparently
was at least 8 percent higher in 1979 than it
should have been, due to overstatement of
housing costs during the 1968-79 period (Chart
4). Considering the myriad public and private
programs and contracts which use the CPI as
an inflation index, such an overstatement itself
has introduced inflation-related distortions
into the economy.
Mortgage policy
Finally, some brief observations may be
made concerning the relationship between
mortgage instruments and the housing market.
The general trends in the data and the simple
regression analysis presented here are not con-
sistent with the notion of severely binding
cash-flow constraints on housing. However,
our tests are admittedly weak, and it is impos-
sible to say whether the standard fixed-pay-
ment mortgage and mortgage lenders' qualifi-
Chart 4
Alternative Housing Cost Measures and Inflation















43cation standards are completely unimportant,
or are simply overwhelmed by other factors.
Policies to relieve the constraint-such as pro-
moting graduated-payment mortgages or eq-
uity-sharing arrangements with lenders-should
help cause housing demand to increase if the
constraint has been at least somewhat binding.
With given supply conditions, this should lead
to an increase in the real price of housing,
though not by enough to fully offset the re-
duced implicit costs of housing assets.
VII. Conclusion
In our analysis, rIsmg inflation expecta-
tions-interacting with the tax treatment of
housing-help account for several major re-
cent trends in the housing market. Our em-
phasis on inflation expectations is not meant
to deny the influence of other factors. Indeed,
the maturing of the "baby boom" generation,
local restrictions on new housing investment,
and the proliferation of single-headed house-
holds all have contributed to rising real hous-
ing prices. However, the lack of evidence of
any rise in user costs (as proxied by real market
rents) suggests that such factors have not been
the dominant force in stimulating rising hous-
ing prices. Moreover, our analysis suggests that
the housing "crisis" is not one of widespread
unavailability of housing at reasonable costs.
On the contrary, inflation and the tax structure
may have encouraged too great a commitment
of resources to housing, and may have created
further distortions because of the mismeasure-
ment of housing costs in the CPl.
Appendix A
Computational Details
This study utilized quarterly US. data series
throughout. The following is a list of the
sources of the data, with manipulations per-
formed as noted.
Price. A real housing-price index was con-
structed with the C-27 data of the US. De-
partment of Commerce, which relate to the
price of new one-family houses, including the
value of the lots. This index is for a unit of
fixed characteristics, and was deflated by the
personal-consumption expenditures deflator.
Rent. A real rental index was constructed
with the rental survey component of the con-
sumer-price-index, deflated by the personal-
consumption expenditures deflator.
General Inflation Expectations. A number of
series were tested. The one employed in the
regressions is from Scadding (1979), based on
analysis of the inflation forecasting implicit in
consumption behavior.
Housing Inflation Expectations. A number of
series were tested. The one employed in Table
1 is an eight-quarter, third-degree polynomial
distributed lag on the change in nominal hous-
ing prices.
Housing Stock. The real value ofthe housing
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stock per household was obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (US. Depart-
ment of Commerce) estimates of the value of
fixed, residential capital in the US. The series
is reported in the Survey of Current Business.
This annual series was interpolated quarterly
using the quarterly measure of the number of
housing units.
Households. Annual data on the number of
households is reported in the Bureau of the
Census, Current Population Reports, Series p-
20. Quarterly values were interpolated.
Nominal Interest Rate. The AAA corporate-
bond rate is employed as a measure of the
nominal interest rate. The mortgage rate was
also tested, but a useful series could not be
obtained because of variations in the features
of the instrument over time. In addition, an
open-market rate such as the AAA bond rate
more accurately reflects the opportunity costs
of housing equity.
Permanent Income. An estimate of perma-
nent income per household was obtained with
data on disposable personal income, and with
an estimation method described in Darby
(1974).Rental/Price Ratio. The benchmark ratio of
nominal rents and prices was obtained from
data from the 1975 National Housing Survey.
The rental-price index and the housing-price
index reported above were used to complete
the series.
Econometric Methods. All of the reported
regression estimates were obtained with the
use of ordinary least-square methods. An
eight-quarter, third degree, unconstrained
polynomial distributed-lag structure was em-
ployed on the components of the opportunity-
cost variable in the regressions reported. This
was done because the opportunity-cost vari-
able should theoretically be entered separately
for each period into the future; we have as-
sumed that a household's forecast of these fu-
ture values is contained in current and recent
past estimates of the opportunity cost. (The
regressions were also run using contempora-
neous values only; the results were qualita-
tively similar.)
FOOTNOTES
1. See, for example, Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski
(1978).
2. The best data are available for new housing only. How-
ever, theory would suggest that the prices of close sub-
stitutes (existing homes, for example) would move simi-
larly. The available data suggest that this is, indeed, the
case.
3. Increased quality accounts for approximately 15 percent
of the increase in average sales prices of homes sold in
the period 1970-79. The data on new housing prices and
characteristics are available in U.S. Bureau of the Census
Reports C-25 and C-27.
4. Data on housing tenure are available from the Current
Population Survey of the Bureau of the Census. There is
some lack of comparability between this relatively recent
source of data and the decennial census that makes com-
parisons of tenure patterns over time difficult. Moreover,
we are primarily interested in the value-weighted tenure
share, to control for quality changes. One such attempt to
create this type of data (published periodically in U.S.
DepartmentofCommerce, SurveyofCurrent Business),
also shows an acceleration in owner share, however.
5. See the Annual Housing Survey, General Housing
Characteristics, Part A.
6. See, for example, S. Nicholson, "Rental Housing: Why
Don't the Numbers Work?" Building, December 1979.
7. "Apartment Trends," U.S. Housing Markets, March
1980, p. 10, and Rental Housing: A National Problem
that Needs Immediate Attention, Report to Congress by
the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, No-
vember 8, 1979, p. 11.
8. "Condo Conversions: 79's Boom Won't Bust," Hous-
ing, March 1980, p. 35, and "Apartment Trends," U.S.
Housing Markets, September 1979, p. 10.
9. See, for example, N. Mayer (1977).
10. See, for example, A. Polinsky (1979).
11. See, for example, W. E. Diewert (1974). In the view
taken here, wealth is considered to be an exogenous
variable and therefore appears as an argument of the
demand relationship. If wealth is viewed as endogenous,
then the optimal stock of an asset depends only on op-
portunity costs if the asset's services are easily marketed.
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Hess (1977) tests and rejects the exclusion of wealth from
asset-stock demand relationships.
Although, conceptually, opportunity costs for each period
in the future are separately relevant to asset-stock de-
mand, we assume that inflation expectations are constant
over the entire planning horizon, and thus the entire time
path can be represented by a single period's opportunity
costs.
12. See, for example, Rosen and Rosen (1980).
13. Ignoring depreciation, a profit-maximizing landlord
adds to his housing stock until after-tax rental income
equals the (after-tax) cost of carrying the stock per period.
That is, until
(1 -t)R = ((1-t)(r+z) - (1 -c)z)P
where t is the landlord's effective capital-gains tax rate.
(Note the assumption, for simplicity, that h=z.) Thus
R = ((r+z) z(1-c)/(1-t))P
relates the market rental and expectations. By compari-
son, owner-occupant opportunity costs are
U = ((1 -t)r - tz)P
under similar conditions. Clearly, in the extreme case
where capital gains are treated like ordinary income, t = c
and 8R/8z = O. That is, landlord costs are unaffected by
inflation expectations. Even for lower capital-gains tax
rates, however, landlord costs will not decline as much as
owner-occupied housing costs as long as t2';;;c. The tax
treatment of depreciation causes further offsets in. the
cost-reducing effect of rising inflation expectations, be-
cause the historic-cost basis of landlords' depreciation
allowances causes the depreciation deduction to fall in
real value as inflation rises. See, for example, de Leeuw
and Ozanne (1979) and Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski
(1978). In addition, a non-tax feature-the fear of rent
control-may cause landlords to feel that their future in-
come or capital gains are compromised by rising inflation.
This may be an important factor in some markets and it
is one that deservesseparate attention; forsimplicity, how-
ever, we treat these effects as an element of a "tax" policy
toward rental housing since it, too, has the effect ofmaking
the breakeven rent less favorably sensitive to inflation
expectations.14. This approach is in sharpest contrast to that of Rosen
and Rosen (1980), in which changes in tenure patterns
are related to differences between the equilibrium levels
of rents and opportunity costs. They do not detail the
model which underlies their analysis, and it is not clear
why rents and opportunity costs should not move together,
although their empirical work assumes that this is the
case.
15. A technical appendix describing a mathematical ver-
sion of the model is available from the author.
16. A securely rising marginal tax rate and/or a falling real
interest rate could also contribute to this effect. Indeed,
these may represent additional avenues through which
inflation-induced distortions can affect the housing market.
Marginal tax rates can rise as the result of "bracket
creep"-the effect of a progressive tax-rate structure ap-
plied to nominal income. Feldstein and Summers have
also argued that inflation (coupled with tax policy) can
reduce aggregate loan demand and, hence, the (real)
interest rate. (See Feldstein and Summers, "Inflation, Tax
Rules and the Long Term Interest Rate," Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity, Volume 1, 1978.) Although
these effects are not specifically addressed in this paper,
they are consistent with the general notion that inflation-
induced distortion, rather than income or demographics,
is the primary factor behind relative price and rent move-
ments in the housing market.
17. See, for example, the viewpoints cited in "Legislating
to Restrain Coops and Condos," Business Week, Feb-
ruary 18, 1980, p. 90-91.
18. The most careful study of "affordability" is Kearl
(1979). However, Kearl attempts to measure the effects
of "affordability" constraints by including the initial mort-
gage payment in his regressions. It is not clear that a
useful proxy for this effect can be devised, since the true
shadow price of the constaint is unobservable. In addition,
the variable used by Kearl is highly correlated with the
nominal mortgage rate, which would have the sign he
finds in his analysis irrespective of affordability problems.
19. See A. Hess, "Credit conditions and Automobile De-
mand," University of Washington (mimeo), August 1976
and March 1980, revised. See also van Order and Villani
(1979), who propose a less general form of constraint.
20. A recent popular version of this hypothesis is pre-
sented in Cardiff and English (1979).
21. See, for example, R. Flood and P. Garber, "Market
Fundamentals versus Price-Level Bubbles: The First
Tests," Journal of Political Economy, September, 1980.
22. This is the range of tax rates implicit in the relative
rates of return of taxable and non-taxable securities of
similar quality, as well as the tax on interest income, es-
timated using Colin Wright's technique from IRS statistics.
(See Colin Wright in Harberger, 1969.) The real-estate
industry uses an estimate of one percent of market value
each for maintenance and depreciation, although a higher
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figure for both is probably justifiable. (See Laidler in Har-
berger, 1969) Property taxes average 2.5 percent of mar-
ket value. Insurance and expected uninsurable losses
likely add less than one percent. Finally, in the context of
our model, transactions costs and any costs due to the
"liquidity" of the housing asset must be added to these
other components.
23. Indeed, the fact that Kearl (1979) employs this as-
sumption and finds an affordability constraint may be re-
lated.
24. The model may be solved for the absolute level of real
housing prices and rents by making some assumptions
about supply conditions. That is, we have assumed that
prices move to equate the stock demanded with the avail-
able total stock, or to preserve
D(U,W) = D(R,W) = K,
where K is the available housing stock. However, K is not
fixed, but rather is itself a function of real housing prices.
Specifically, if one imagines the housing industry respond-
ing with a lag to changes in the real price,
K - K_ 1 = d(K*(P)-K_1)
where K* is the long-run stock supply implied by the cur-
rent real price and d is a constant or function denoting the
relationship between actual and long-run changes in the
stock. Thus in general the supply relationship may be
written
and P may, in principle, be derived from the solution of
stock demand and this supply condition or,
P = P(u, W, K_ 1) = P(i, z,W, K_ 1).
Similarly, R may be determined as
R = R(P, W, K_ 1) = R'(u, W, K_ 1) = R'(i, z, W, K_ 1).
25. If supply were perfectly inelastic (with respect to the
real price), increases in the interest rate would depress
real prices, but not affect market rentals; conversely, if
supply were perfectly elastic, an increase in the mortgage
rate would not affect the real price but would depress real
rentals. Our finding that both are affected is consistent
with the notion of imperfectly elastic supply.
26. See Kane (1980).
27. The method of constructing the housing component
is detailed in "Housing Costs in the CPI," Monthly Labor
Review, February 1956, pp. 184-196.
28. Janet Norwood, "The Consumer Price Index Puzzle,"
Challenge, March-April, 1980, pp. 41-45, Tables 1 and
2. This is conservative because the weights employed in
the "rental equivalence" series are based on expenditures
and do not incorporate capital-gains effects on income.Howenstine, E. J. "Housing Costs in the U.S. and Other
Industrial Countries," Washington, D.C.: Department
of Housing and Urban De~elopment, 1979.
Kane, E. J. "Accelerating Inflation and the Distribution of
Household Savings Incentives," Working Paper
#470, National Bureau of Economic Research, April
1980.
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